Why Walt Balls Waltz

Something I found of particular interest in this week’s readings was Stephen Walt’s concept of the “balance of threat.” The traditional balance of power theory first defined in such seemingly iron-clad terms by Kenneth Waltz is obviously flawed, and there are many counter-examples one can use to disprove it. Why do some states bandwagon with others more powerful and possibly threatening to them? Why aren’t the states of the EU aligned with China to “hard balance” the United States? There are many subtleties for which Waltz’ version of the balance of power does not account that have been left for later theorists to draw out.

Stephen Walt’s “balance of threat” I find particularly interesting because it combines elements of realist and constructivist (and maybe liberal too, I don’t know) theory together. Why don’t Canada and Mexico join forces against the U.S.? This question may better be answered by more traditional theory that would argue that the U.S.’s established hegemonic order not only presents an unassailable front of strength against the two, but gives them strong incentives to free-ride on our regional security and benefit from the public goods we provide. But what of the question asked earlier about China and the EU? Here it may be useful to bring in the “balance of threat” theory. It is very plausible that the EU (though probably also overwhelmed by the U.S.’s military predominance and likely “soft balancing” in some more subterranean ways against the U.S.) simply does not see the United States as a threat. This may be for any number of reasons, but a very prominent one is likely that the U.S. and EU’s common cultural background, shared history and perceived future of cooperation, and liberal trade regimes militate against the use of military force (by far the most threatening of all implements of national power) in almost any circumstance of conflicting national interest. A constructivist theory of “shared norms” and whatever else they say successfully thereby lowers their perceived threat of each other.

A more interesting application of Walt’s theory is to how the United States cannot help but perpetuate the threat to us from the “axis of evil.” Our most dangerous state enemies in the world today all fall within the authoritarian to dictatorial range of government. The greatest threat to governments such as these is not war, but regime change. The United States has a long history of intervention (usually with the blessing and/or material support of the UN) in the face of state sovereignty, and its more recent record of unprovoked unilateralist intervention has only helped to make authoritarian rulers around the world tremble. Authoritarians’ perception of threat from the United States is huge, and rightly so. It has been argued well that North Korea, for example, began its nuclear program at the end of the Cold War as its Soviet protector had fallen, the U.S. was instigating regime-change from Panama to Somalia, and little remained to assure the Kims that the U.S. would not do the same in North Korea. So they built nuclear weapons, and as long as we cannot prove to them that we will not invade – that we are not a threat – it is unlikely that they will completely abandon them, and so will remain a threat to us. Similarly, China will perceive us as a threat and hedge against us as long as we rail about human rights abuses and more transparent government (and to be fair, probably long after that as well). If we wish to make peace and disarm through diplomacy countries like North Korea, we must first recognize our global image especially amongst our enemies as a dire and incorrigible threat.