A Diversionary Non-War?

Recently, the Pakistani urban center of Lahore was terrorized by a series of bombings against civilian targets, a phenomena that has previously been isolated primarily to rural regions in recent years, particularly northwestern tribal regions out of reach of the central government.

In the wake of these attacks, some Pakistanis have called for a softer stance against the terrorist organizations that execute such attacks. In essence, the violence is driving them to adopt a counter-jingoistic political stance, which directly contradicts Musharraf's calls to continue fighting terrorism with "full force". As a matter of fact, it seems that at least a segment of this group of dissenters actually blames Musharraf's hard-line policies for the attacks, instead of the terrorist organizations that actually carried them out. This story has implications for the arguments for going to war which we are currently studying.

In today's lecture (11 Mar.) we heard about third-level arguments for going to war, the most relevant to this story being the ideas of "Diversionary War" and "Audience Costs." In a Diversionary War, a leader will go to war to increase domestic support. However, we see here that perhaps the "Rally-round-the-flag" effect does not always apply. As a matter of fact, participating in wars might actually have the opposite effect; as citizens grow weary of falling victim to a conflict that they view as unnecessary, they might seek to throw out the regime that perpetuates the conflict. We saw this phenomenon in Spain in the wake of the infamous Madrid train bombings, for example, where the relatively pro-U.S. and pro-War on Terror government was rejected in favor of a Socialist Party that would withdraw military support from anti-terror operations. The idea of staying in a war because of audience costs theoretically implies that a leader will stay in war in order to maintain domestic credibility. However, if public opinion turns against a war, it might actually be more of a credit to the leader if he ends the conflict. If Musharraf backs down from supporting the United States in fighting groups like al-Queda, he might stand to gain from increased domestic support, or at least a less vociferous opposition. However, it is apparent that Musharraf still holds support from the United States and confronting the threat from terrorists to be more important than quelling the domestic dissent caused by his policies.

Of course, this case is certainly not typical in a historical sense. After all, al-Queda is a non-state actor, more difficult to isolate and identify than a state adversary, and the war against al-Queda is one with immediate plans or conditions for victory. So perhaps it is only understandable that the rally-round-the-flag effect will not be as strong in this case. However, it is still interesting to view it in that framework for the purpose of testing the established arguments for going to war.

Articles to read:
Blasts Push Pakistan Toward New Policy
Dozens Killed in Lahore Attacks