When Will the Neocons Die?

The article by Krebs and Lobasz examined how, since the September 11th attacks, the Bush administration has been able to sell to the public its general War on Terror and, more specifically, the war in Iraq. It is important to note that, while the authors press their claim that strong rhetorical campaigns are necessary in forging a strong foreign policy, rhetoric does not pertain at all to the policy formation itself. While a predetermined foreign policy may have to be adjusted due to constraints from public opposition, its nature and its goals have already been decided. It is for rhetoric to construct an ideology with which to sell the predetermined international political strategy to the American public. A strong foreign policy necessarily is backed by a convincing ideology. That is what Krebs and Lobasz want to examine.
It has always been a challenge for administrations to sell their foreign policies to the American public and, as Kupchan detailed in his article “Grand Strategy for a Divided America” we read earlier in the semester, a strong foreign policy in recent American history has required strong bipartisan support. Strong and focused foreign policy flourished during the highs and lows of the Cold War, but with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the beginnings of an era of uncertain grand strategy, it became multidirectional and confused. Humanitarian missions and UN-sanctioned interventions made for a confusing foreign policy that lacked a clear driving purpose in the eyes of the American public. This was exemplified by the CNN-led public opinion disaster in Somalia. However, the September 11th attacks provided the catalyst for a new compelling ideology to power the Bush Administration’s foreign policy.
Krebs and Lowasz explain how the Bush Administration has been able to so successfully pull off the war in Iraq. Armed with a policy designed to fight “evil” – a component that had been conspicuously absent in over a decade of moral ambiguity – the Administration was easily able to neutralize the Democratic opposition and sell to the public its neoconservative foreign policy that had been formulated long before the 9/11 attacks. It was in this way that the Administration not only found support for its “third-level” war in Afghanistan, but more impressively for its baffling “first-level” decision to invade Iraq.
Suppose hypothetically that the Bush Administration was to stay in office for another eight years (horrendous, but just suppose). Would they be able to maintain their ideological and rhetorical campaign identified by Krebs and Lowasz and continue to isolate the Democrats and convince the public? Would they be able to sell another likely “first-level” foreign policy decision to establish a hawkish position against, or even strike, Iran? How far does this brilliant post-September 11th rhetorical campaign go? With the public opinion boost after the surge and the conspicuous absence of significant drawdown in Iraq, it has seemed to provide nearly inexhaustible resources to fire the neoconservative political strategy.