Just War Theory and The French Troop Surge

In recent news, this story brings out some of the issues regarding Just War Theory.
The French government has decided to increase its troop commitment in Afghanistan from 1600 to 2300 soldiers. The extra 700 will be sent to the Eastern region, allowing the United States to shift troops from the relatively peaceful East to the more violent South, where Canadian troops are based. Canada has stated that in order to remain in Afghanistan, they would require not only more backup in the southern part of the country, but more troop commitment overall from other countries. Sarkozy's decision is expected to fulfill this demand, thus allowing Canada to remain in Afghanistan to help keep stability in the country.

Since France had already made a commitment to the conflict years prior, the Jus ad bellum aspect of the decision is already a bygone conclusion. However, we should consider the reasons why France went there in the first place. Arguably, it was in order to show support for its (marginal) ally, the United States, and to take a stand against international terrorism and Islamic extremism in particular, which has taken French as well as American lives. There was a humanitarian aspect to the conflict as well: the Taliban was one of the world's most backwards, repressive regimes, especially with regards to its treatment of women and non-Muslims (most of whom were forced either to convert or to flee the country), as well as Muslims who disagreed with their extremist agenda. While the French public might not have been heavily opposed to the original decision to go into Afghanistan, however, the tide seems to have changed, especially in light of the perceived "imperialism" of the United States stemming from the Iraq war, and this article claims that 68% of French voters oppose the troop increase. However, France is a democratic country, and nobody is forced into military service against his will, so overall, France's action may be interpreted as being largely legitimate. Additionally, as a sovereign and independent state, it does have the necessary competence de guerre, in addition from the approval of international institutions in not only sending troops to Afghanistan in the first place, but choosing to increase its presence there now.
With regards to Jus in bello issues, France seems to be doing as good a job as can be reasonably expected. France has not come under heavy political fire from unbiased observers for unnecessary use of force in Afghanistan. There have been, of course, a number of civilian deaths, as there are in almost any armed conflict. However, the noncombatant deaths inflicted by French forces, and coalition forces in general, are arguably far from intentional, and while any civilian deaths are unwanted, France has been careful to avoid using levels of force that might lead to excessive noncombatant casualties. This also ties in with the proportionality aspect of its use of force in Afghanistan: in spite of having a significant military force, with relatively modern weaponry (in spite of the surrender-monkey stereotype), it has chosen to keep a reasonably low profile in the country, composing only 2,300 of the roughly 47,000 coalition troops. This is in keeping with the idea of using force in proportion with enemy strength. And it has certainly refrained from using any weapons considered ethically unacceptable on the modern battlefield, using conventional weaponry instead of, for instance, nuclear weapons, which it is capable of using. As for the problem of identification, a war like that in Afghanistan, although not quite as clear-cut as an interstate war, does allow for some degree of differentiation between the civilian population and enemy combatants, since much of the fighting in Afghanistan has occured in rural areas, far removed from major population centers. And arguably, there is no need to worry about fighting with or against soldiers working under compelling conditions, since neither France nor the Taliban practice conscription (as far as I know). People might argue that insurgents might have originally joined out of economic necessity, however, there is little evidence for this, and you can likewise argue that any modern military relies on economic necessity, since soldiers are paid and often come from the lower and middle classes, so insurgents are no more compelled to fight than French and other coalition soldiers.
This brings us to Jus post bellum considerations. Since we are technically no longer fighting a traditional war in Afghanistan, these are perhaps the most relevant to the conflict there as it is today. The coalition forces are there not to overthrow or fight against a government, but to rebuild the country and stabilize it. They are trying to institute a democratic order, in which the people, and not a few radical Islamists (as under the Taliban) or a military dicatorship (as, arguably, Pakistan has under Musharraf), are able to determine the course their country takes. This fulfills the self-determination aspect of Jus post bellum. As for legitimacy, there is not a significant amount of evidence indicating that a strong majority in Afghanistan want France and the rest of the coalition to leave immediately, further legitimizing France's presence there. France's decision also demonstrates its commitment to put enough resources in the country and enough boots on the ground to provide real support for the reconstruction and stabilization of Afghanistan.
So, in spite of the mistakes and the troop increases' relative unpopularity among the French public, by framing its move in the context of Just War Theory, France's decision to increase its troop presence in Afghanistan is justified.